

Promo-LEX presents the final results of the parallel vote count for the Presidential Elections of the Republic of Moldova and a report of the incidents noted by observers on Election Day

I. FINAL RESULTS FROM VOTE TABULATION BY THE Promo-LEX EOM

1.1. Comparative analysis of the data from the vote tabulations provided by the Promo-LEX EOM and the Central Electoral Commission

The preliminary results of the election were tabulated by the Promo-LEX EOM using SMS messages sent by observers present in 1981 PS within the territory of the Republic of Moldova.

The final results presented by the Promo-LEX EOM on the number of valid votes cast for each electoral candidate were calculated using data on the results of the vote count written in 1981 reporting forms from the polling stations within the territory of the Republic of Moldova, given to Promo-LEX EOM observers and manually verified by the Observation Mission.

Candidates	Preliminary data from Promo-LEX	Final data from Promo-LEX	The difference between Promo-LEX's preliminary and final data	Preliminary data from the CEC	The difference between Promo-LEX's final data and the CEC's preliminary data
<i>Igor Dodon</i>	814795	815111	-316	814971	140

Maia Sandu	646123	646664	-541	647422	-758
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1.2. Accuracy of the reporting forms for the results of the vote tabulation

As part of the monitoring effort for Round Two of the Presidential Elections of the Republic of Moldova, the Promo-LEX EOM analyzed the accuracy of the reporting forms for the results of the vote count. To this end, 1981 reporting forms (which had been given to Promo-LEX observers by EOPS presidents) were examined.

The total number of reporting forms that contained errors in at least one verification formula, or incomplete data is 34. Among these, *3 reporting forms did not contain data relating to the number of valid votes cast for candidates.* Another 31 reporting forms were completed with errors in at least one verification formula (1.56%). This number is lower than in the first round of presidential elections, when 3.06% of reporting forms contained errors, which were found using the verification formulas.

The accuracy of the reporting forms was verified using the formulas embedded in the text of the reporting forms: $c \leq a + b$; $c \geq d$; $d=f+h$; $e=c-d$; $f=d-h$; $h=g_1+g_2+g_3+g_4+\dots+g_n$; $i=c+j$; $j=i-c$. The results, from a statistical point of view, are presented in the following way:

Formula	Number of errors in problematic reporting forms (based on 31 reporting forms with errors)
$c \leq a + b$	16
$c \geq d$	16
$d=f+h$	16
$e=c-d$	8
$f=d-h$	16
$h=g_1+g_2+g_3+g_4+\dots+g_n$	10
$i=c+j$	16

The formula $c \leq a + b$, which assumes that the number of voters who took ballots must be smaller than or equal to the sum of the number of voters on the main electoral lists and on the supplementary electoral lists, was incorrect for 16 reporting forms out of 1981. This error suggests that more voters received ballots than were written on the electoral lists (both main and supplementary).

The formula $c \geq d$ indicates that the number of voters who received ballots (calculated using the signatures on electoral lists) should be equal to or greater than the number of ballots taken out of the ballot boxes. Sixteen reporting forms out of 1981 have been identified in which this formula was not respected, which suggests that more ballots were taken out of the ballot boxes than were issued.

The formula $d=f+h$ was not correct in 16 reporting forms. In these cases, it was not successfully demonstrated that the number of ballots taken out of the ballot boxes equals the sum of the valid and invalid ballots cast. This could raise doubts regarding the accuracy of the tabulation of valid ballots cast, and, therefore, the result for each candidate.

The formula $e=c-d$ could not be demonstrated in 8 reporting forms. Thus, the number of signatures on the electoral lists did not equal the number of ballots taken from the ballot box in 8 polling stations.

The formula $f=d-h$ checks that the number of ballots declared invalid is the difference between the total number of ballots and the number of valid ballots cast. Errors in the application of this verification formula are reported in 16 reporting forms. This validates the conclusions presented at the verification formula $d=f+h$.

The formula $h=g_1+g_2+g_3+g_4+\dots+g_n$ has not been complied in 10

cases. That is, the sum of the votes for each of the candidates did not equal the total number of valid votes cast, in these reporting forms. *This calls into question the accuracy of the results for each electoral candidate.*

The formula $i=c+j$ could not be correctly applied in 16 reporting forms. The same situation was found with regard to the formula $j=i-c$. Thus, either *unused and cancelled ballots or the signatures on the electoral lists were incorrectly counted.* In addition, we ascertain that the expression “unused and cancelled” can cause confusion for EOPS members, who could confuse two distinct categories of ballots.

II. INCIDENTS NOTED DURING ELECTION DAY

2.1. Restricted access or the obstruction of the free observation process – 6 cases.

Restrictions on the grounds that the accreditation from Round I was not valid (1)	Permission was not given to use cell phones (2)	Permission was not given to move around the PS (2)	There was no space for observers (1)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 14 Basarabeasca 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 154, 205 Chişinău 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 1, 237 Chişinău 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 6 Criuleni

2.2. The presence of publicity materials, advertisements and billboards in the vicinity of the polling station (within 100 m of the PS) – 15 cases.

Igor Dodon – 7 cases	Maia Sandu – 5 cases	Unidentified – 3 cases
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 6 Ungheni • PS 22, 23 Căuşeni • PS 128, 152 Chişinău <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 10 Ialoveni • PS 3 Călăraşi 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 198 Chişinău • PS 5 Floreşti • PS 10 Ialoveni • PS 3, 4 Călăraşi 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 13 Ialoveni • PS 278 Chişinău • PS 10 Basarabeasca

2.3. Ballot boxes were not sealed according to legal procedures. Tearing/damage or absence of seals on ballot boxes – 9 cases.

- PS 71 Chişinău. Initially only one ballot box was sealed; the polling station received 3 ballot boxes, but not enough seals. The other two ballot boxes were located in the basement. Finally, when the other ballot boxes were moved to the PS, one ballot box was sealed with a single seal and the other with two seals.
- PS 265 Chişinău. There were only three seals on a stationary ballot box. One seal was accidentally damaged, but was not replaced with a new seal, because there were no extra seals available.
- PS 287 Chişinău. One of the stationary ballot boxes was not sealed.
- PS 34 Bălţi. One of the seals on the ballot box broke. Members of the EOPS filled in a reporting form and replaced the seal.
- PS 9 Bălţi. The ballot boxes did not have four seals. The mobile ballot box was sealed.
- PS 25 Cimişlia. There were 4 ballot boxes in the polling station, of which only one was sealed. At that time only the sealed ballot box was being used.
- PS 7 Cimişlia. There were 2 ballot boxes in the polling station, of which only one was sealed. At that time only the sealed ballot box was being used.
- PS 25 Floreşti. The mobile ballot box was not sealed according to the regulations.
- PS 391 Iaşi, Romania.

2.4. The unjustified presence of unauthorized people on the premises or within 50 meters of polling stations – 55 cases in the following polling stations at least.

Mayor, representative of the city hall	People who claimed to be observers, but who did not have credentials	Supporters of electoral candidates	Unidentified people
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 33 Cahul • PS 16 Florești • PS 67 ATUG 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 143 Chișinău (PPSRM) • PS 2 Edineț (PPSRM) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 278 Chișinău (PPSRM) • PS 10 Șoldănești (PPSRM) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 34, 57, 180 Chișinău • PS 3 Cahul • PS 22 Cimișlia • PS 2 Edineț • PS 9 Ungheni • PS 411 Odessa, Ukraine

2.5. Rumors, attempts and incidents of material or monetary compensation being offered to voters within the perimeter and/ or on the premises of polling stations with the purpose of influencing voters – 10 cases.

<i>Igor Dodon – 5 cases</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 10, 82 Chișinău. The PPSRM observer had a list of voters, on which he marked them down. After they had voted, he went outside with them. • PS 7 Dubăsari. In the vicinity of the polling station, two people (presumably supporters of the PPSRM) talked with voters for about 3 hours; there were rumors about the purchase of votes. • PS 44 Cimișlia. The observer from the PPSRM party left the polling station and talked with a voter in front of the PS, asking if he had been given money. When they saw the STO they left. • PS 58 Florești. Voters who had come in minibuses from the left side of the Nistru in order to vote stopped on the way back (after crossing the river) and were rewarded for their votes.
<i>Maia Sandu – 1 case</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 308 Chișinău. A voter stated that he had been paid 100 lei to vote for Maia Sandu.
<i>Unidentified – 4 cases</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 22 ATUG. • PS 58 Florești. • PS 27 Bălți. • PS 49 ATUG.

2.6. Electoral campaigning or black PR within the

perimeter and/ or on the premises of polling stations with the purpose of influencing voters – 20 cases.

<i>Igor Dodon – 15 cases</i>	<i>Maia Sandu – 4 cases</i>	<i>Unidentified – 1 case</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 58 Orhei (2 cases) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 20 Şoldăneşti • PS 4 Briceni • PS 186, 265, 215, 20 Chişinău • PS 49, 4 Floreşti <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 23 Căuşeni • PS 8 Călăraşi • PS 7 Dubăsari • PS 7 Cimişlia • PS 23 Rezina 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 25 Hânceşti • PS 37, 38 Orhei • PS 189 Chişinău 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 95 Chişinău

2.7. Organized transport of voters – 39 PS, at least 160 vehicles including automobiles, minibuses and buses.

<i>Igor Dodon – 8 PS, at least 47 vehicles</i>	<i>Maia Sandu – 0 cases</i>	<i>Unidentified – 31 PS, at least 113 vehicles</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 29 Briceni • PS 22 Căuşeni • PS 1, 3, 10 Dubăsari • PS 24 Ştefan Vodă 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 19, 24, 41, 42 Anenii Noi <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 24, 26, 32 Căuşeni • PS 225, 271, 278 Chişinău <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 3 Criuleni • PS 2, 5 Dubăsari • PS 5, 43 Edineţ • PS 58 Floreşti <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 33 Ocniţa • PS 42 Rezina • PS 14 Soroca • PS 39 Străşeni • PS 24 Ştefan Vodă <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 2 Ungheni • PS 4, 18, 42, 44, 45, 50, 52, 53 AT

2.8. Acts of violence or intimidation of voters or other people – 19 cases.

Against EOPS members – 14 cases	Against observers – 3 cases	Against voters – 2 cases
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 14, 119, 136, 138, 180, 200, 257, 247 Chişinău <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 1 Căuşeni • PS 18, 38 Bălţi • PS 43 Hânceşti • PS 6 Ialoveni • PS 350 Montreuil, France 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 69 Orhei • PS 23, 247 Chişinău 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 67 ATUG • PS 3 Rezina

2.9. Problems in the functioning of SAIS Elections– 42 cases in 46 PS.

<p>Suspension of PS operation for a short time – 11 cases.</p>	<p>Situations in which SAIS Elections indicates that a voter has already voted but the voter maintained that he/ she has not voted – 9 cases.</p>	<p>The number of voters according to SAIS Elections does not equal the number of voters according to the paper lists – 3 cases.</p>	<p>Problems with the actions of the operators– 3 cases.</p>	<p>Unidentified – 5 cases.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 21 Taraclia • PS 3 Rezina • PS 22 Cimişlia • PS 29, 16 Bălţi • PS 50 Floreşti • PS 59 Sângerei (from 7:00 am to 12.40 pm) • PS 390 Bucharest, Romania • PS 5 Călăraşi • PS 24 Criuleni • PS 29 ATUG. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 60, 200, 231, 237 Chişinău • PS 47, Calăraşi • PS 320 Saint Petersburg, Russia • PS 349, Villeneuve-Saint-George, France • PS 394 Braşov • PS 350 Paris, France 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 180, 216 Chişinău • PS 24 Criuleni 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 42 Rezina (the inclusion of a supplementary operator) • PS 24 Căuşeni. (a single operator) • PS 47 Floreşti (both operators left for about 15 minutes.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 411, Odessa, Ukraine • PS 347, Paris, France • PS 370 Rome, Italy • PS 345 Verona, Italy • PS 397 Bacău, Romania.

2.10. Problems with the electoral lists– 27 cases.

The absence of voters on the main lists (6)	Deceased people on the lists (9)	Signatures in the places of other voters (2)	The presence of unknown people under voters' domiciles (9)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 24 Criuleni • PS 34, 44 Bălți • PS 120 Chișinău • PS 2 Florești • PS 59 Sângerei 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 3 Călărași • PS 38, 77, 90, 114, 180, 200, 296 Chișinău • PS 21 Bălți 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 23, 34 Bălți 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 20, 25, 85, 87, 119, 123, 135, 222, 223 Chișinău

PS 5 Fălești. On the basic electoral list 3204 voters were included.

2.11. The photographing of ballots– 84 cases at the following PS:

- PS 12, 13, 20, 27, 25, 33, 94, 103, 105, 111, 115, 119, 120, 123, 126, 131, 135, 137, 142, 143, 144, 147, 148, 155, 158, 180, 181, 182, 186, 194, 198, 203, 210, 230, 232, 248, 257, 263, 267, 296, 299, 302, 307, 309 Chișină,
- PS 2, 22, 50, 57 Bălți,
- PS 27 Briceni,
- PS 3 Călărași,
- PS 31 Căușeni,
- PS 15 Cimișlia,
- PS 7 Dubăsari,
- PS 2 Edineț,
- PS 52 Florești,
- PS 7, 8, 37 Ialoveni,
- PS 1 Leova,
- PS 38 Nisporeni,
- PS 3, 6, 66 Orhei,
- PS 16 Strășeni,
- PS 2 Ungheni,
- PS 12 ATUG,
- PS 350 Montreuil, France,
- PS 394 Brasov, Romania.

2.12. Problems with the electricity (for intervals of up to 3 hours) – at 46 PS.

- PS 260, 254, 301 Chişinău,
- PS 44 Anenii Noi,
- PS 2 Basarabeasca,
- PS 24, 39 Căuşeni,
- PS 5 Călăraşi,
- PS 30, 40, 45 Cimişlia,
- PS 5, 24, 26, 31, 32 Criuleni,
- PS 1 Edineţ,
- PS 10, 48, 49 Făleşti,
- PS 1 Glodeni,
- PS 3, 28, 29 Sângerei,
- PS 59 Soroca,
- PS 6, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 26, 36, 38, 40, 41, 42 Şoldăneşti,
- PS 12, 13, 17, 18, 20 Ştefan Vodă,
- PS 20, 21, 22 Taraclia,
- PS 43, 75 Ungheni.

Polling stations open abroad. According to information from the page www.cec.md, the main electoral lists included 349 people in Round I of the election. In Round II of the election the main electoral lists included 363 people. Note, however, that the 3559 people who took advantage of preliminary registration were supposed to be distributed among polling stations abroad. In addition, according to the official page of the SIRC Register (updated November 10, 2016), there are 102813 citizens of the Republic of Moldova on register as having a permanent place of residence abroad; they should have been automatically registered on the basic electoral lists for outside the country.

2.13. Lines/Queues at PS outside the country – 10 PS.

- PS 318,319 Moscow, Russia,

- PS 355 Bologna, Italy,
- PS 325 Dublin, Ireland,
- PS 330 Bucharest, Romania,
- PS 3 Paris, France,
- PS 336 London, England,
- PS 359 Mestre, Italy,
- PS 375 Verona, Italy,
- PS 366 Parma, Italy.

2.14. List of polling stations abroad at which ballots ran out/ were close to running out before the closing of the polling station:

	PS Location	PSEB Number	Number of voters who received ballots
1	Russian Federation, Moscow (consular section of the Embassy)	317	3000
2	The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, London (mission headquarters)	335	3000
3	The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Stratford	336	3000
4	French Republic, Paris	347	3000
5	French Republic, Villeneuve-Saint-Georges	349	3000
6	Italian Republic, Padova	364	3000
7	Italian Republic, Parma	366	3000
8	Italian Republic, Verona	375	3000
9	Romania, Bucharest	389	3000
10	Romania, Bucharest	390	3000
11	Republic of Ireland, Dublin	325	3000
12	Italian Republic, Mestre	359	2999
13	Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin	345	2999
14	Italian Republic, Bologna	355	2998
15	Russian Federation, Moscow	318	2997
16	Kingdom of Belgium, Brussels	328	2995

17	French Republic, Montreuil	350	2988
18	Italian Republic, Brescia	356	2931

2.15. Problematic situations relating to the use of identity documents in the voting process – at 15 PS.

Voting with expired identity documents (1 case)	Voting with only the additional page of the identity document (7)	Attempts to vote with foreign identity documents (1)	Problems with damaged additional page (3)	Voting without the application of a stamp to the additional page of the identity document (3)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 8 Criuleni 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS101,121, 221, 297 Chişinău • PS 24 Căuşeni <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 24 Hânceşti • PS 41 Cahul 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 40 Bălţi 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 26 Bălţi • PS 4 Căuşeni • PS 181 Chişinău 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PS 181, 221 Chişinău • PS 31 Briceni

The Promo-LEX Observation Mission consists of 42 long-term observers who monitor the electoral process in all constituencies of the Republic of Moldova during 31 August – 30 November 2016. On Election Day, Promo-LEX sent a short-term observer to each polling station in the country. The Promo-LEX EOM will also perform a Parallel Vote Tabulation in all polling stations. The Mission also observes the elections in 47 polling stations abroad. The observers involved in the monitoring process signed the Code of Conduct of the Promo-LEX Independent National Observer, committing to act promptly, in good faith and in a non-partisan manner.. The activity of all observers is coordinated by a central team consisting of 37 persons.

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